University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1995

An Update on the 1993 Federal Rules
Amendments and the Montana Civil Rules
Carl W. Tobias
University of Richmond, ctobias@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, An Update on the 1993 Federal Rules Amendments and the Montana Civil Rules, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 547 (1995)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

AN UPDATE ON THE 1993 FEDERAL RULES
AMENDMENTS AND THE MONTANA CIVIL RULES
Carl Tobias·
One year ago in the pages of the Montana Law Review, I
reported that the Montana Advisory Commission on Rules of
Civil and Appellate Procedure was considering whether to recommend that the Montana Supreme Court adopt for application
in the Montana state courts thorough amendments in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which covers sanctions, and Federal
Rule 26, which prescribes mandatory pre-discovery or automatic
disclosure. 1 The changes in these two provisions, which took
effect on December 1, 1993, were the most controversial components of the most ambitious group of modifications in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during their fifty-seven year history. 2
The 1993 amendment in Rule 11 significantly altered the
1983 version of the Rule, an amendment which was the most
controversial change ever promulgated. The 1993 modification
substantially reduced the incentives for invoking Rule 11. For
instance, the 1993 amendment prescribes safe harbors, whereby
parties who are notified that they may have violated the Rule
are afforded twenty-one days to withdraw or alter the allegedly
offending paper. 3 The 1993 revision correspondingly entrusts to
judicial discretion the imposition of sanctions when litigants or
lawyers contravene Rule 11 and admonishes judges that the
principal purpose of sanctions is deterrence, while suggesting
that monetary sanctions should rarely be levied. 4 Some attorneys and additional interests opposed the amendment principally
because they believed that it would undermine the 1983
revision's effect as a deterrent to frivolous litigation. 5 .

• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for
valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this
piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are
mine.
1. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Federal Rules Amendments and the Montana
Civil Rules, 55 MONT. L. REv. 415 (1994).
2. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Forms, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402 (1993).
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(cXl)(A), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L.
REv. 1775, 1784-85 (1992).
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Carl
Tobias, supra note 3, at 1783-88.
5. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Forms, Dissenting Statement, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402,
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The 1993 change in Rule 26, providing for automatic disclosure, was the most controversial proposal to amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in the Rules' half-century history. The
1993 modification requires that plaintiffs and defendants divulge, prior to discovery, "discoverable information relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings.rn;
Nearly all elements of the organized bar and a number of
other interests strongly opposed the disclosure revision. 7 These
attorneys and interests were uncertain about what they must
disclose, thought that the amendment would impose an additional layer of discovery and believed that disclosure might conflict
with certain aspects of the American judicial process that depends on "adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a
neutral decisionmak.er."8 The 1993 change authorizes each of the
ninety-four federal districts to alter or reject completely the Federal Rule amendment and quite a few courts, including the Montana District, have done so. 9
Sev:eral factors led me to suggest that the Montana Supreme
Court incorporate into the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure the
1993 revision in Federal Rule 11. First, the 1993 modification in
Rule 11 represents a significant improvement in the 1983
amendment and constitutes a workable compromise. 10 Promulgation of the 1993 federal amendment would foster intrastate

507-09 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement]. Justice Clarence Thomas joined this dissent.
·
6. See FED. R. CN. P. 26 (a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 431-32 (1993); see also
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA.
L. REV. 1, 35-39 (1992).
7. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1612-13 (1994)..
8. Dissenting Statement, supra note 5, at 510-11.
9. See FED. R. CN. P. 26(a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 431-32; see also
Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Mont., to
Members of the Federal Bar (Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with author) (advising bar that
court has temporarily modified automatic disclosure provision prescribed in April
1992 civil justice plan to conform more closely with federal amendment); Carl Tobias,
Refining Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 539 (1995)
(indicating that court has proposed reverting to 1992 disclosure rule).
Arizona is the only state which prescribed automatic disclosure before the
Federal amendment became effective. See Symposium: Mandating Disclosure and
Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and
Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1993); see also Alaska Supreme
Court, Final Draft Discovery and Disclosure Rules (adopting disclosure procedure
which will become effective on July 15, 1995). See generally Jill S. Chanen, States
Considering Discovery Reform, AB.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 20.
10. I rely substantially here on Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated,
46 FLA. L. REV. 127 (1994).
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consistency between Federal and Montana Rule 11. Moreover,
Montana has prescribed many of the Federal Rules amendments
promptly after their adoption in the federal courts.
I also suggested that Montana Rule ll's actual operation in
practice should be relevant. It appeared that considerably less
formal Rule 11 activity had occurred under the Montana Rule 11
than the federal analogue, but it has been uncertain exactly how
much and what kind of informal activity, such as threats to
employ the Rule, have occurred. 11 A significant amount of the
most damaging behavior that involved the 1983 revision to Federal Rule 11 implicated its informal invocation. 12 The Montana
Supreme Court and the state district courts have not construed
and applied Montana Rule 11 with complete consistency, and
there has been some satellite litigation under the Montana
Rule. 13
I suggested as well that the manner in which jurisdictions
other than Montana have handled Rule 11 might be relevant.
Quite a few states have now subscribed to the 1993 Federal Rule
revision. 14 It is also important to remember that a small number of jurisdictions had altered their counterparts of the 1983
federal provision before that amendment was changed. 15
I ultimately concluded that the issues critical to prescribing
the Federal revision for the Montana state courts were whether
the increased clarity and decreased incentives to rely on that
provision were greater than the possible loss in terms of deterring frivolous lawsuits. I found that the heightened clarity of the
Federal modification, the amendment's limitation of incentives
for its invocation, and the more balanced approach suggested
that the Montana Supreme Court promulgate the federal change.
I determined that numerous considerations complicate the
question of whether the Montana state court system should prescribe the Federal Rule 26 disclosure revision. One important
11. Cynthia Ford, Unraveling Rule 11, MONT. LAW. 3, 4-6 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Unraveling]; Cynthia Ford, MONT. LAW., Rule 11 is Working Well in Montana 9
(Feb. 1993).
12. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 861-65
(1992).
13. See Unraveling, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Mo. R. CIV. P. 55.03; WYO. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Joel L. Selig,
The 1994 Amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 151, 156-62 (1995) (analyzing amendment to Wyoming Rule 11).
15. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. C. P. 11; WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11. A few states never adopted provisions similar to the 1983 Federal Rule 11 because they seemingly
thought that its disadvantages outweighed its benefits. See, e.g., MAss. CIV. R. 11;
N.Y. CPLR 2105, 3020 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992); see also MD. R. 1-311.
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factor was the difficulty of ascertaining whether any of the automatic disclosure procedures would be efficacious and, if so, which
would be most effective. A tiny number of the some twenty districts which have been experimenting with disclosure for the
longest time employed mechanisms similar to the federal amendment.16
I found some anecdotal evidence indicating that a number of
Early Implementation Districts Courts (EIDCs) which have been
applying disclosure have encountered little difficulty implementing it. 17 Disclosure apparently operates best in rather routine,
simple litigation or when the disclosure is relatively general. 18
Additional anecdotal material suggests that counsel are less
critical of automatic disclosure after they have acquired familiarity with the measure. 19
I recommended several ways in which the Montana Supreme
Court could treat automatic disclosure. One approach was to
wait for more definitive conclusions from the ongoing experimentation with disclosure in the federal district courts. I also suggested that the Montana state courts might implement an experimental program. For example, the Montana Supreme Court
could have identified several districts for experimentation with
disclosure techniques which have proved most promising in the
federal system. 20 Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court might
have revised Montana Rule 26 to require some form of automatic
disclosure. I ultimately recommended that the lack of informa-

16. The districts based disclosure on the Advisory Committee's preliminary
draft. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139,
144-45 (1993). Even these courts have not experimented with or assessed disclosure
for sufficient time to derive conclusive determinations about its effectiveness. Most of
the Early Implementation District Courts under the CJRA only instituted disclosure
during 1992, and few have rigorously evaluated its efficacy. See id. at 144-45.
17. These are the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona,
Massachusetts, and Montana. This evidence is premised on conversations with many
individuals, including advisory group reporters and members, court personnel, and
practitioners, who are familiar with civil justice reform in those districts. See generally supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. Unfortunately, discovery presents the most significant complications and
demands the most efficacious reform in complex litigation, such as civil rights class
actions and products liability cases, and when parties need relatively specific information.
19. This idea is premised on the conversations, supra note 17. Numerous lawyers apparently have found that disclosure principally requires attorneys and their
clients to participate in certain activities-especially document retrieval and labelling-earlier in litigation. This idea is based on the conversations, supra note 17.
20. See Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure,
27 GA. L. REV. 665, 666-71 (1993); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).

1995]

FEDERAL RULES AMENDMENTS

551

tion about how automatic disclosure in fact functions and about
which of the disclosure procedures is most workable meant that
the Montana Supreme Court should probably await the conclusion of experimentation that is now proceeding in a number of
federal districts.
The Montana Advisory Commission on Rules of Civil and
Appellate Procedure has not yet submitted its recommendation
regarding the 1993 Federal Rules revisions to the Montana Supreme Court. 21 There is apparently little inclination on the part
of the members of the Commission or of the Montana Supreme
Court to adopt the 1993 amendments. The Commission and the
Court seem to have premised their determinations on the controversial nature of the 1993 modifications in Rule 11 and in Rule
26 and on uncertainty about how the new provisions would actually operate, believing that it is preferable to see how the procedures will function.
The positions of the Advisory Commission and of the Montana Supreme Court have much to commend them, and are defensible, although I partly disagree with the decisions of the
Commission and the court. I believe that the 1993 Federal Rti.le
amendment in Rule 11 substantially improves the 1983 revision
which was extremely controversial. The 1993 version includes
phrasing that is clearer, while it reduces incentives to invoke the
provision. The determinations of the Commission and the court
regarding Rule 11 are more justifiable because Montana Rule 11
has apparently fostered comparatively little satellite litigation
and has been invoked rather infrequently, at least in formal
settings. The limited use of the provision is probably attributable
to the restraint and good judgment of judges, lawyers and parties who participate in civil litigation in the Montana state
courts. Nevertheless, I think that amendment is now warranted,
and I urge the Commission and the court to reconsider their
decisions.
The decisions of the Advisory Commission and of the Montana Supreme Court respecting automatic disclosure are more
defensible. Rule 26(a) remains quite controversial at the federal
level, and fewer than a majority of the ninety-four districts have
subscribed to the Federal Rule amendment. 22 None of the vari-

21. I rely substantially in this paragraph on telephone conversations with Randy Cox, Boone, Karlberg & Haddon and member of Montana Advisory Commission on
Rules of Civil and Appellate Practice (Dec. 5, 1994, Feb. 2, 1995 & May 23, 1995).
22. See Memorandum from Alfred W. Cortese & Kathleen L. Blaner, Mandatory
Disclosure Rule 26(a)(l): Not the Rule of Choice (Oct. 28, 1994) (on file with author);
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ous forms of automatic disclosure with which courts have been
experimenting has clearly emerged as very efficacious. The application of disclosure in the Montana Federal District Court has
apparently worked rather well, but much of this can probably be
ascribed to the ingenuity and goodwill of the small, comparatively collegial federal bar. Only a few states have adopted disclosure, and many seem to be awaiting the results of federal
experimentation before proceeding. The determinations of the
Advisory Commission and of the Montana Supreme Court to
delay the adoption and implementation of disclosure, therefore,
seem advisable at this juncture.
CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court should adopt the 1993 Federal
Rule amendment to Rule 11 for application in the Montana state
court system. The controversial nature of the revision in Rule 26
means that the court should probably continue to defer that
provision's prescription while awaiting the results of experimentation in the federal districts and the tiny number of states
which have adopted the procedure.

Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United States District Courts, With
Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26 (Mar. 24, 1995).

